Checks and Balances in Two Systems of Government

Indonesia and Japan

Authors

  • Wirianingsih Wirianingsih Universitas Islam Bandung, Indonesia
  • Toto Tohir Suriaatmaja Universitas Islam Bandung, Indonesia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.46924/jihk.v8i2.505

Keywords:

Checks and Balances, Separation of Powers, Presidential System, Parliamentary System

Abstract

Checks and balances constitute a fundamental principle of modern constitutionalism, evolving from the separation of powers to prevent the concentration of governmental authority and ensure institutional accountability. This study comparatively examines the design and effectiveness of legislative oversight over the executive in Indonesia’s presidential system and Japan’s parliamentary system. Using a normative-juridical method, the study applies statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches through analysis of constitutional provisions, legislation, institutional documents, and legal scholarship. The findings show that Indonesia adopts a relative separation of powers, with the House of Representatives (DPR) exercising legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions to constrain executive authority. Japan, by contrast, employs a parliamentary system characterized by a fusion of powers, in which the Cabinet is politically accountable to the National Diet. The effectiveness of checks and balances depends on political configurations, institutional capacity, and constitutional arrangements. Thus, checks and balances are context-dependent mechanisms shaped by each system’s constitutional and political structure.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Journals

Barak, Aharon. “The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy.” Israel Law Review 33, no. 1 (1999): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223700015879.

Fahira, Yumna. “Sistem Checks and Balances Dalam Menjaga Prinsip Demokrasi Di Indonesia.” Jurnal Media Akademik 3, no. 6 (2025): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.62281/v3i6.2173.

Farabi, Muhammad Fawwaz Farhan, Muhammad Bagir Shadr, Irfan Khalis, Nurul Intan, and Muhammad Akbar Hanafi. “Efektivitas Fungsi Pengawasan DPR Di Tengah Dominasi Koalisi Gemuk.” Jurnal Konstitusi Dan Demokrasi 5, no. 2 (2025): 95–105. https://doi.org/10.7454/JKD.v5i2.1507.

Fudin, Hanif. “Aktualisasi Checks And Balances Lembaga Negara: Antara Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Dan Mahkamah Konstitusi.” Jurnal Konstitusi 19, no. 1 (2022): 202–24. https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1919.

Goldbarsht, Doron, and Hannah Harris. “Check the Balance: Is the Doctrine of Separation of Powers Sufficient in the Context of Intergovernmental Organisations? A Case Study of Australia’s AML/CTF Financing Framework.” Federal Law Review 50, no. 4 (2022): 527–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X221126558.

Higashijima, Masaaki, Naoki Shimizu, Hidekuni Washida, and Yuki Yanai. “Partisan Reactions to Endogenous Election Timing: Evidence from Conjoint Experiments in Japan.” Political Behavior, ahead of print, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-025-10106-7.

Kurniawati, Dian, and Elva Imeldatur Rohmah. “Peran Mahkamah Konstitusi Dalam Penguatan Prinsip Checks and Balances Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia.” Qaumiyyah: Jurnal Hukum Tata Negara 5, no. 2 (2024): 183–207. https://doi.org/10.24239/qaumiyyah.v5i2.158.

Pamungkas, Susandi Decapriu Putra, and Gede Ngurah Darma Suputra. “Pemberlakuan Asas Pembagian Kekuasaan Dalam Prinsip Check and Balances Menurut Teori Hukum Tata Negara Di Indonesia Dan Amerika Serikat.” Wijaya Putra Law Review 2, no. 2 (2023): 139–58. https://doi.org/10.38156/wplr.v2i2.161.

Rachman, Irfan Nur. “Penguatan Fungsi Pengawasan Legislatif Terhadap Eksekutif Pasca Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi.” Jurnal Konstitusi 8, no. 2 (2016): 69–90. https://doi.org/10.31078/jk824.

Shinoda, Tomohito. “The Japanese Prime Minister and the Executive Institutional Setting.” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 8, no. 1 (2023): 68–82. https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911221107189.

Siregar, Muhammad Akbar, Joice Natalia Lubis, Patrecia Gabriella Siregar, and Novita Sari Sitompul. “Dinamika Check & Balance Antar Lembaga Negara Di Indonesia Pada Masa Periode Kedua Presiden Jokowi.” Journal of Contemporary Law Studies 2, no. 4 (2025): 365–72. https://doi.org/10.47134/lawstudies.v2i4.4765.

Sunarto, Sunarto. “Prinsip Checks and Balances Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia.” Masalah-Masalah Hukum 45, no. 2 (2016): 157–63. https://doi.org/10.14710/mmh.45.2.2016.157-163.

Tampung, Mijak, and Munawir Munawir. “Penguatan Prinsip Checks and Balances Antara Legislatif Dan Eksekutif Dalam Sistem Presidensial Indonesia.” Nunquam Moriuntur 4 (2024): 9–18.

Taorik, Nisrina Fawwazy, and Efik Yusdiansyah. “Implementasi Hak Angket DPR Untuk Mewujudkan Prinsip Checks and Balances Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Di Indonesia.” Bandung Conference Series: Law Studies 6, no. 1 (2026): 325–32. https://doi.org/10.29313/bcsls.v6i1.21834.

Books

Isra, Saldi. Pergeseran Fungsi Legislasi: Menguatnya Model Legislasi Parlementer Dalam Sistem Presidensial Indonesia. RajaGrafindo Persada, 2010.

Manan, Bagir. Lembaga Kepresidenan. 3rd ed. FH UII Press, 2006.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat baron de. Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws. Edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone. Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Nakano, Kōichi. Party Politics and Decentralization in Japan and France: When the Opposition Governs. Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies. Routledge, 2009.

Sartori, Giovanni. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes. 2nd ed. New York Univ. Press, 1997.

Downloads

Published

2026-09-11

How to Cite

Checks and Balances in Two Systems of Government: Indonesia and Japan. (2026). JIHK, 8(2), 56-74. https://doi.org/10.46924/jihk.v8i2.505